Widespread violence is unlikely to return to Iraq

In the past week, two bombs targeted Shia pilgrims taking part in a religious holiday, killing at least 66 people in Baghdad. Attacks also continue in the more volatile parts of Iraq, especially the north, where they are more frequent than elsewhere. However, this is not Iraq on the brink. Even as US troops begin to withdraw at the end of August, security will not necessarily deteriorate in any exceptional manner. Those who predict a return to devastating violence usually do so without considering who might orchestrate it. Al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI) and other militants are no longer shaping the country. Previous suggestions that marginalising Iraq's Sunni political actors will lead to violent unrest are also proving to be unfounded. Crucially, Iraq no longer hosts the same organised and potent terrorist activity it did before. Sunni Arabs, the most disenchanted in the aftermath of the war, are no longer collaborating with al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI), particularly since AQI is busy hunting the former down for engaging in the US-formed Sons of Iraq scheme that forced it and other jihadists to the north. Granted, violence may continue. Extremist groups are still able to penetrate Iraq's borders from neighbouring states. An extremist wing of the divided and outlawed Ba'ath party, led by Saddam's former number two, Izzet Douri, who is believed to be in Yemen, also continues to enjoy a safe haven in Syria, where Ba'athists recently held their first public meeting since 2003 . Yet, despite ongoing attacks, Iraqis are not flocking to militias for cover and instead place their faith in the respected Iraqi security forces. As militants continue to fight in their last remaining bastions in the north in Mosul, Diyala and Kirkuk, areas outside of Baghdad in the south are enjoying ongoing improvements in security and should soon mirror the Kurdish north. Iraq, in its entirety, is experiencing an overall decline in violence. There may also be cause for concern as the US withdraws combat troops at the end of August. Save for the north, though, it is difficult to envisage that this will have any dramatic impact on security since the US already plays a largely hands-off role. Given the weaknesses of the Iraqi intelligence services, US intelligence is likely to be kept on, even after the withdrawal process has been completed. In the north, troops may also be kept on in some capacity. On Monday, a fist fight led to gunfire among Kurdish and Arab forces in Diyala. Two Iraqi soldiers, a Kurdish officer and one civilian were wounded in the clash. Authorities may have called it a misunderstanding, but it was a sign of just how easily a minor exchange could lead to more serious violence. In any case, it is doubtful that Iraq will host yet another Kurd-Arab war like it has done historically . History has proven that opportunism and pragmatism have played as much a role as anything else in the Baghdad-Kurdistan wars. For the time being, both sides will be satisfied and are unlikely to recklessly gamble away their post-2003 gains. It would be complacent to suggest that the government-formation process does not attach some degree of uncertainty to the security climate. Groups may, for example, look to initiate attacks or, at the very least, facilitate them as part of the ongoing bargaining process in Baghdad. However, unless Iraqis once again play host to the broad, effective coalition of anti-government elements that were once able to work together and organise themselves under the same banner, unsubstantiated suggestions that Iraq will return to the brink only serve to increase tensions and, as a result, become reckless to the extreme.